This paper examines the degree and patterns of intergenerational economic mobility in Italy. It uses data from the Bank of Italy's repeated cross-section household survey. Retrospective information on parental economic status may be exploited by applying a two-sample two-stage least squares estimation. I estimate the intergenerational income elasticity for Italy and investigate the main mobility patterns across the distribution. From an overall comparison, the evidence provided in this paper hints that Italy is in the low-mobility group among advanced societies, in the range of values found in the U.S. and the UK. The transmission of economic status appears to be particularly strong at the top of the income distribution. I investigate the role of education in the transmission of economic status in Italy and find evidence that children with the same level of formal education seem to have unequal chances in the labor market depending on family background.
Introduction
A large body of social science research has long questioned whether all individuals have the same opportunity to achieve social and economic success irrespective of their parents' status. Moreover, rapidly expanding international literature has been investigating the degree to which socioeconomic status is passed on between generations. Recent reviews of the latest efforts by both economists (see Solon, 2002; Corak, 2004) and sociologists (Breen, 2004; Breen and Jonsson, 2005 ) find significant differences in the degree of inequality persistence across countries.
Economists tend to choose income or earnings as the preferred dimension to characterize one's position. Increasingly, the literature has shed light on a number of problems with correctly defining and measuring intergenerational mobility when focusing on this particular individual dimension of social status. One criterion has been the estimation of single-number expressions for levels of mobility in the form of degrees of association of the economic outcome of an individual with his/her family background. This can be done, for instance, by studying the relationship between the economic outcomes of members of the same family in different generations.
While most of the literature focuses on the United States, a number of studies have been devoted to the analysis of the transmission of economic status in other countries (e.g., Britain, Germany, Canada and Sweden). International studies are important not only for the natural interest in characterizing an important facet of a country's income inequality, but also because comparisons among countries can contribute to an understanding of the mechanisms underlying generational income mobility. How are countries with different institutional settings in the labor market, different educational systems, and different levels of cross-sectional inequality doing in terms of intergenerational mobility?
From this perspective, Italy certainly represents an interesting case for comparison. Its labor market is heavily regulated with fairly centralized wagesetting institutions, and a high proportion of its workforce is covered by collective bargaining. The school system is extremely centralized and egalitarian, and the level of cross-sectional income inequality is lower than in the United States but higher than most Western European countries (Brandolini and Smeeding, 2006) .
Being notably characterized by the limited availability of data, Italy has received relatively little attention in the economic literature. Lack of data has constrained previous studies to focus on measures of "socioeconomic" conditions, such as occupational class or educational attainments. In a widely quoted study, Checchi et al. (1999) find that intergenerational mobility between occupations and between education levels in Italy is lower than in the United States. International comparisons by sociologists indicate that Italy displays low levels of intergenerational mobility in terms of social fluidity (Breen, 2004) .
By taking advantage of recently developed empirical methods used to overcome similar data limitations in a number of other countries (Bjorklund and Jantti, 1997; Grawe, 2004) , I am able to produce new internationally comparable evidence on the transmission of economic status in Italy. The evidence seems to confirm the existence of considerable intergenerational economic persistence in Italy. The magnitudes of the summary mobility measures are within the range of values found in the "least" mobile advanced countries (Britain and United States) and noticeably higher than those estimated in the Scandinavian countries. I also find evidence of particularly high persistence at the top of the income distribution, indicating that children born into rich families very likely will become rich adults. In this respect as well, Italy seems to resemble Britain and the U.S. more than other advanced countries (Jantti et al., 2006) . When evaluating the contribution of education in the transmission of economic status, I find that approximately onethird of the intergenerational coefficient is accounted for by the fact that the children of rich parents are also more educated.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic econometric model of the intergenerational transmission of economic status and outlines the empirical methods used for the estimation. Section 3 describes the data and the selection process of the observations into the final samples. Section 4 presents and discusses the estimates. Section 5 concludes.
Measurement Issues and Previous Literature
When attempting an empirical analysis of the degree of intergenerational economic mobility, a large number of economic researchers have looked at measures that summarize in a single number the joint distribution of income at two points in time. If Y the corresponding value for fathers, then the intergenerational relationship can be specified as:
from which it is evident that β can be interpreted as a summary measure of the degree of intergenerational persistence. In order to estimate the relationship, a measure of the long-run economic status as well as a combination of representatives of two different generations is needed. Most authors use income or earnings as preferred measures of economic status, while fathers and sons are predominantly chosen to represent the two succeeding generations. The standard linear equation (1) is the base of most empirical work in the economic literature. Typically, a regression of a logarithmic measure of the sons' incomes on a logarithmic measure of the fathers' incomes is performed. Then, the coefficient β -the intergenerational income elasticity -is estimated by applying ordinary least squares (OLS). By construction, the elasticity β will indicate the percent difference in the sons' incomes observed for each 1 percent difference across the incomes of the fathers.
The existing evidence can be broadly split into two major waves. The earlier studies on the issue resulted in estimates of β at around 0.2, leading to the conclusion that advanced countries were characterized by strong mobility. It is well recognized that the earlier, lower estimates from these studies were biased downward by the measurement error in single-year observations of fathers' incomes and by the use of particularly homogeneous samples (Solon, 1999) . Aware of these two problems, empirical studies in the 1990's based their analyses on longitudinal samples and used representative data. By averaging the fathers' earnings over more than only one year (generally five years), these studies reported estimates of the elasticity consistently above the previous ones (Table 1 ). An alternative strategy for dealing with measurement error in incomes has been to resort to instrumental variable (IV) estimation. This approach consists of using one or more variables as an instrument for the fathers' incomes or earnings (the most common variables are occupational status and education). A problem in the IV estimates concerns the possibility of instruments being correlated to the sons' economic status independently of the fathers' incomes (e.g., fathers' education). As formally detailed in Solon (1992) , if the instruments have a separate positive impact on the dependent variable an upward bias in the IV estimator will result.
Estimates of the intergenerational elasticity also vary with the age at which economic status for both fathers and sons is observed (life-cycle bias). In particular, there seems to be a downward bias for those estimates based on measures of the sons' earnings taken at early stages of their careers and on mature fathers rather than young fathers (Grawe, 2006; Haider and Solon, 2006; Reville, 1995) . This is because individuals with higher long-run earnings will experience a faster growth of their earnings compared to those with lower long-run earnings. Therefore, there will be a greater dispersion in incomes later in the life cycle. Keeping the variance in fathers' earnings constant, the resulting sons' variance will be smaller in the earlier years of their careers, causing a downward effect on the intergenerational elasticity estimates. Similarly, when considering mature fathers, a larger variance in fathers' earnings must explain the same variance in sons' earnings and the estimated degree of persistence falls. Source: Author's selection from the review in Corak (2006) for the countries having a longitudinal dataset. Studies are chosen on the basis of measurement error corrections (multiyear measures of fathers' incomes or instrumental variables) and age ranges.
Methodology used for estimating β in Italy
The procedures by which the results in Table 1 are obtained are not directly applicable to the case of Italy. Like most countries, Italy does not have a long enough intergenerational panel that permits the explicit observation of father-son pairs. Comi (2004) includes Italy in her comparative analysis of intergenerational earnings elasticities in Europe, using data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The use of a single dataset with common variable definitions and sample selection is the main advantage of her study. However, Comi acknowledges the serious downward bias deriving from the exceptionally young age at which children are observed in the ECHP dataset. To the extent that life-cycle biases can be assumed to be similar across countries, the main contribution of Comi's paper is to provide cross-national comparable evidence for the 12 European countries in the sample. She finds Italy to have the highest β in Europe, with an estimated coefficient of 0.27.
Compared to Comi, the present study attempts to provide an estimate of the degree of intergenerational persistence in Italy that is closer to the true elasticity. This makes a comparison to the international evidence reviewed above easier. In addition, as a single-country study, this paper offers a more detailed analysis of the intergenerational transmission patterns specific to the Italian case.
In order to provide comparable evidence on the degree and patterns of intergenerational persistence in Italy, this paper exploits retrospective information on parental background in repeated cross sections from household surveys. A contemporaneous and independent work by Mocetti (2007) utilizes the same type of information to investigate intergenerational persistence in Italy. Because it is based on the same data, the preferred estimator of the linear elasticity is the same in the two papers (two-sample two-stage least squares or TS2SLS). Although we adopt different sample selection rules, the main linear estimates are consistently close.
1 The present paper provides distinctive information on the robustness of the preferred estimates and presents additional results from an alternative estimator in order to enhance comparability with previous studies. While there is considerable overlap in the estimation of the linear elasticity, the two papers differ in the rest of their analyses. In particular, this paper estimates the transition probabilities among income classes to account for nonlinear patterns in the intergenerational relationship and provides an assessment of the "education channel" in the transmission of economic status. 
Estimators based on parental background information
Income or earnings is usually not found among the parental characteristics reported by sons, however, occupational status, level of education and other demographic characteristics are common. These latter variables can be used to infer income from a sample of older men (synthetic fathers) and thereby to estimate intergenerational correlations. This procedure is a special case of the "two-sample instrumental variable" (TSIV) technique examined in Angrist and Krueger (1992) and Arellano and Meghir (1992) . Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) first applied this methodology to intergenerational mobility estimation (with Swedish and U.S. data). They performed a two-stage regression based on two samples: a sample of sons who reported their fathers' socioeconomic characteristics and a sample of adult men (pseudo fathers) whose age was consistent with that of the actual fathers. Once the samples are selected, the steps required for this empirical strategy are: (i) estimate an income equation from the older sample, (ii) use the estimated coefficients to predict fathers' incomes on the basis of sons' reports; (iii) regress sons' incomes on the predicted fathers' incomes.
Let the relation between fathers' current ( 1 Mocetti acknowledges the similarities as well as the consistency between our papers. 2 Mocetti has no direct empirical assessment of the role of education in the intergenerational income correlation, and he chooses to run quantile regressions to investigate nonlinearities. X being independent. Substituting into equation (2) gives:
Y cannot be directly observed from the sample of sons, an estimate of λ is obtained by regressing equation (4) using the distinct sample of pseudo fathers.
The coefficient λˆ thus obtained will permit a prediction of income for the actual fathers,
The standard linear intergenerational regression is then performed on the fathers' predicted incomes:
current earnings and the five-year average of fathers' earnings are very close to those of Solon (1992) and are lower than the TS2SLS estimates (0.33-0.39 compared to 0.42-0.52). They suggest interpreting these two measures as lower and upper bound, respectively, of the true value of the intergenerational elasticity. Mazumder (2005) shows that even a five-year average of fathers' incomes can still cause a downward bias in the estimated value. 4 This would offset some of the bias introduced by the previous concern.
The estimated values in Table 2 -obtained from TS2SLS -confirm the difference in mobility levels between Sweden and the U.S. as shown in the previous table and point at France as a sort of intermediate case. In addition, the results for Brazil and Ecuador are consistent with the conjecture of stronger intergenerational persistence in less developed countries (see Solon, 2002) . 
Note that s i Z represents the vector of observable sociodemographic characteristics used as predictors of income in the sample of sons. Typically, the coefficient 1 β from equation (7) observed characteristics and the unpredicted part of sons' incomes. Dearden et al. (1997) and Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) do indeed find lower values of the income elasticity when using the "prediction approach." 
Data and Sample Selection
In this paper, I use data from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a national, representative household survey based on a random sample of approximately 8,000 households per year that is available annually from 1977-1987 and for odd years after 1987. The SHIW is the only easily accessible source of microdata on income that spans this long period. Brandolini (1999) describes Italian data sources and concludes that the SHIW still represents the best source of income distribution information in Italy. In order to enhance comparisons over time, the Bank of Italy has constructed a Historical Database, starting with the 1977 survey and addressing the numerous changes the SHIW questionnaire has undergone over the years (D'Alessio and Gallo, 1997; D'Alessio, 1997) . In the recent waves of the survey, heads of households are asked to report some characteristics of their parents when they were the same age as the respondent currently is, such as educational qualifications, employment status and year of birth. All income is recorded net of taxes and social security contributions with separate records for each recipient along with basic individual characteristics such as age, sex, education, work status, and employment sector. In what follows, I will use annual net disposable personal income. This includes earned income from wages, salaries, and self-employment, as well as other cash income from property, but it does not include income from financial assets. This income definition is narrower than total market income (defined as before tax income from all market sources) and broader than earnings. Results from separate regressions using only net labor earnings will also be reported. 
Sample selection
The sample of fathers is taken from the surveys conducted in 1977, 1978, and 1979 , which are the oldest waves of the SHIW available. The selection of fathers into the final sample tries to follow the standard procedure adopted in most of the similar studies of economic mobility. I consider employed males who are heads of households and the father of at least one child. I include all fathers aged 30 to 50 (i.e., born between 1927 and 1949) . Following the majority of previous studies, individuals who report a nonpositive income are excluded for a final first-stage sample of 3,015 individuals.
The sample of sons is taken from the 2000, 2002, and 2004 SHIW. They are male heads of household aged 30 to 45, whose fathers were born between 1927 and 1949.
7 Consistent with studies of mobility in other countries, I consider employed individuals with positive income and a report of their fathers' sociodemographic characteristics for a final sample of 1,956 sons. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for selected individuals in both samples. Note that for both generations the age range of the observations is close to the optimal period identified in Haider and Solon (2006) . 6 Previous studies have found evidence of higher intergenerational coefficients for broader income concepts, as predicted by theory (see Mulligan, 1997; Corak and Heisz, 1999; and Mazumder, 2005) . The use of net income and earnings should result, if anything, in more conservative estimates compared to other studies.
7 Mocetti (2007) uses individuals aged 30 to 50 and does not require the fathers' ages to be consistent with the selection in the first sample. To perform the two empirical estimations described in section 2, I need a set of observable variables from the recall information in 2000-2004 that I can use in the first-stage sample for predicting fathers' incomes. I use the following categorical variables: educational attainments, work status, employment sector, and geographic area.
8 Information on education is in terms of maximum educational achievements. There are five categories: no school (less than one year of schooling), elementary (five years), lower secondary school (eight years), high school (thirteen years), bachelor (seventeen-eighteen years). Contrary to most similar studies, the occupational categories are not recoded following a social class schema. As noted by Checchi and Dardanoni (2002) , the SHIW data do not provide a detailed classification of occupational status, making it difficult to construct a ranking of occupation based on social prestige or any other social grading. Furthermore, the detail of information on work status and sector of activity in the fathers' sample does not perfectly match with the characteristics sons are asked to report. In order to perform the analysis, I rearrange the more disaggregated information on work status reported by the children to be comparable with the available classification for parents. A similar rearrangement is effectuated for the variable "employment sector" where sons' reports are less detailed than the information directly observed from fathers. As a result, based on the available information, I obtain four work status categories (blue collar, office workers/teachers, managers/professionals/entrepreneurs, and self-employed) and four sectors of employment (agriculture, industry, public administration, and private services). The last variable is a geographic dummy, which indicates whether the father was residing in the South.
9
The relationship between the observable characteristics and income in the pseudo-fathers sample is assumed to be valid for the true fathers. Since this cannot be verified, I check if the distribution of the characteristics self reported in the first-stage sample is consistent with the distribution of the characteristics reported by the sons. Table A1 in the appendix compares the fathers' own reported characteristics with the sons' reports. The distributions appear to be consistent. The existing differences are of the same nature found in previous studies that use this technique. In particular, pseudo fathers have, on average, a higher level of schooling and more skilled occupations than the actual fathers. Typically, these discrepancies are ascribed to differential childbearing according to occupation and educational attainment. Table A2 in the appendix. In light of the coefficients reported in Table 4 , intergenerational persistence of economic status in Italy appears to be high and significant. 11 The TS2SLS estimate of β is 0.554 or 0.435 depending on the definition of income used.
Empirical Results

Regression results
12 Broadly speaking, 9 I include this variable in order to account for the well-known geographic disparities in Italy. Considering a larger set of geographical areas only has a minor impact on estimates. While we can directly observe the area of residence in the sample of pseudo fathers, we do not have the same information for the actual fathers. I use the sons' place of birth as a proxy for the geographic area where the sons were mainly living when they grew up. 10 To the extent that fathers with many sons are overrepresented in the sample of sons, the differences are to be expected when occupation and education are correlated with the number of sons.
11 To calculate standard errors when using predicted income, I use the bootstrap procedure. First, I draw a bootstrap first-stage sample of fathers from which I estimate the parameters used to generate predicted incomes. Then a bootstrap sample of sons is drawn and used for running the second-stage regression on fathers' predicted incomes. After repeating this process 1,000 times, the bootstrap standard error is estimated by the standard deviation of the distribution of the bootstrap estimates.
12 Consistent with previous international evidence, the estimates based on the broader income concept are significantly higher.
this indicates that about one-half of the economic advantage of Italian fathers is passed on to their sons. As expected, the values obtained when predicting incomes for both generations are lower, 0.395-0.354. Both pairs of values are similar in magnitude to those found for the U.S. by Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) Mocetti (2007) reports coefficients that are similar in magnitude to those reported in Table 4 , row 1. His TS2SLS estimates of β are 0.61 and 0.50 for income and earnings, respectively. Mocetti's somewhat higher values might be related to a slightly older age at which he observes sons. In any case, there is no indication of significant differences with my TS2SLS results. Therefore, the two studies provide consistent evidence of high values for the persistence parameter in Italy. I check the results in Table 4 using various sensitivity tests. 14 Tables A3-A6 in the appendix show the results from a number of alternative regressions estimating the coefficients in rows 1-2. Coefficients did not change in a statistically (and practically) significant way for minor variations of the age at which I observed sons (Table A3 ) and were not sensitive to a rough correction for underreporting of self-employed income (Table A4) . 15 Analogous results are obtained when a dummy for schooling beyond compulsory is used as the 13 Their TS2SLS values for the U.S. are 0.417-0.516, depending on whether controls for age are included, while the estimates obtained by predicting both incomes are 0.294-0.327. Note that their corresponding values for Sweden (uncorrected for age) are 0.282-0363 and 0.216-240, respectively.
14 Estimates based on pooled data included year dummies. Coefficients were not statistically different if year dummies were excluded or if different combinations of survey years were used.
15 Following Checchi and Dardanoni (2002) , I revised income from self-employment upward by 40 percent. This is the discrepancy of self-employment figures with corresponding values based on national accounts averaged over the period 1980-1993. education measure (as in Bjorklund and Jantti, 1997) and/or when a full set of interactions between work status and industry sector is included (Table A5) . 16 As discussed in section 2, the studies that have used the two-sample twostage estimator acknowledge that at least some of the instruments used in the first stage are likely to have a direct effect on the sons' incomes. Although it is not possible to test whether each of the instruments fails the orthogonality condition, I can check for the failure of any of them as overidentifying restrictions by means of the Sargan test. As expected, the test statistic on the entire set of overidentifying restrictions detects the presence of instruments correlated with the regression error. 17 In order to shed some light on the direction of this specification bias, I performed the two-sample two-stage estimation using different subsets of predictors of income. Table A6 reports the estimates of β for various combinations of the available instruments. The variation in the elasticity estimates shows that the exclusion of educational and geographical dummies tends to decrease the estimates, while the opposite is true when the employment-sector variable is excluded. Note, however, that even the most conservative estimates in Table A6 still point to a low level of overall mobility in Italy.
Transition matrix
While the β elasticity serves as a summary measure of the overall intergenerational persistence within a population, it reveals little regarding the patterns of mobility. Because the summary measures implicitly assume a constant intergenerational elasticity across different points of the income distribution, they cannot reveal differences in mobility patterns by income levels. Hence, if we seek to understand the effect of marginal increases in parental income for specific groups, overall intergenerational elasticity estimates will be of little help; neither the poor nor the rich may be well described by the average measure.
A useful way to distinguish the patterns of intergenerational mobility is provided by transition matrices. This approach relies on discrete categorizations and investigates the conditional probabilities of transition among ordered income quantiles. Based on this flexible approach to mobility, Jantti et al. (2006) found interesting cross-country differences in income persistence at specific parts of the bivariate income distribution.
In order to examine Italian mobility patterns, I construct quintiles group mobility matrices based on my sample. Table 5 gives the fraction of sons in each income class given the predicted class of their fathers. The information in Table 5 enables us to investigate the direction and pattern of mobility in a way that cannot be accomplished by mean regression measures.
I note the existence of a "wealth trap"; that is, richer people are very likely to pass on their economic status to their children. About 40 percent of Italians born in the highest income quintile remain there. Poorer individuals have a relatively good chance of upward mobility in the lower part of the matrix so that the persistence in the first class is not exceptionally high. Notice that the matrix is based on a predicted measure of the fathers' incomes. Consequently, the transition probabilities are not to be taken as if they were generated by actual incomes. In comparing the patterns in Table 5 to those in the previous literature, one should keep in mind this difference.
The overall picture emerging from the above matrix is consistent with the findings of Checchi et al. (1999) based on different Italian data and a different analytical procedure. While higher persistence at the tails of the distribution is a common finding in most advanced countries (Jantti et al., 2006; Blanden, 2005) , the exceptionally high persistence in the upper tail of the distribution seem to be a distinctive trait of the intergenerational transmission process in Italy. 
Family background and educational attainments
Considering the way higher education is financed in Italy, high levels of economic persistence may appear as a rather surprising result. Checchi et al. (1999) compare the education systems in Italy and the U.S. They present summary evidence that the institutional differences result in education being less expensive and more uniform in quality in Italy. 18 However, the authors also show that a lower cost of education does not necessarily attract the expected educational investment of poor families. Table 6 reports mean fathers' incomes (in logs) for five classes of sons' educational attainments. It shows the existence of an association between levels of education and the fathers' incomes, with higher graduates having on average richer fathers. What can be said about the role of this relationship in the transmission of economic status in Italy? Is it possible to evaluate the income persistence through superior educational attainments of richer children? Table 6 Sons' Educational Attainments and Fathers' Incomes Notes: Author's own calculation from survey data.
For the U.S., Bowles and Gintis (2002) seek to uncover the channels through which parental income influences an offspring's income by decomposing the intergenerational correlation into additive components reflecting the contribution of various mechanisms. I follow their strategy in order to estimate the size of the "education channel" in the transmission of economic status. This allows me to assess how much of the intergenerational association is accounted for by the fact that children with more education have richer parents. Suppose that fathers' income ( E ), which is correlated with fathers' income. It is a property of regression coefficients to be decomposable into additive parts: the intergenerational correlation (or the intergenerational income elasticity) can be expressed as the sum of the standardized regression coefficients of fathers' 18 The analysis in Checchi et al. is based on summary data from different sources: OECD, U.S. Education Department, and ISTAT (Italian National Statistical Agency).
Sons' Education
Mean Fathers' Log Income The above simple exercise shows that roughly one-third of the intergenerational income coefficient is statistically accounted for by the fact that the children of rich parents are also more educated. In other words, if one assumes that the only channel of intergenerational income correlation would work through the association of father's income and child's education, the income regression coefficient for our sample of Italian men would be equal to 0.161.
The relative contribution of education on the persistence estimate is higher when considering only labor earnings instead of a broader income definition. This is not surprising, given that the main difference between the two income concepts is in the inclusion of property income. Theory (and common sense) suggests that property income is not only more persistent than earnings, but it is also outside the education channel.
Two considerations on the findings from the correlation decomposition are in order. First, once we have accounted for the superior educational attainments of richer children, a very large proportion of the inheritance process is still left unexplained. That is, a number of key intervening variables seem to work outside of the "education channel." Second, while the non-negligible contribution of the offspring's education to the intergenerational coefficient indicates that the Italian educational system is a significant vehicle for the transmission of economic status, it would be wrong to interpret this finding as a "causal" effect. The interpretation would be causal if all of the links in the observed relationships had been properly identified. Some of the sons' unobservable characteristics will exert a direct effect upon both their level of schooling and later income. If these aspects are not measured by the fathers' income variable, the levels of education achieved will incorporate the effect of these unmeasured variables on the sons' earnings. In addition, there are several potential reasons behind the correlation between fathers' income and sons' education. We do not know if money by itself "buys" more schooling for the children. A number of important determinants of educational outcome (e.g., ability, family culture, and parental education levels) are related to, but not caused by, parental income.
Concluding Remarks
Data limitations have restricted mobility studies on Italy. No longitudinal survey long enough to provide information on actual incomes of both parents and children exists. Recent econometric innovations employed in the literature permit us to use the Bank of Italy Survey of Households' Income and Wealth to overcome some of the data problems for Italy. Retrospective information in the repeated cross sections is exploited by applying a two-sample two-stage least squares estimation. The remaining limitations of the database are addressed by performing several auxiliary regressions.
When comparing the results of this study with those obtained from other countries, one has to be aware that cross-country comparisons of intergenerational mobility are very difficult. This is essentially because international comparisons have much more severe data requirements than single-country studies. Comparability of results demands similar information on both fathers' and sons' incomes, as well as special attention to sample selection rules applied to the datasets. If comparative studies do not attempt a parallel analysis for the countries involved then it is difficult to say whether differences in the intergenerational income persistence reflect true differences in mobility or are driven by different income measures, age ranges, or other sample selection criteria. Looking at the results from existing studies that have used similar estimation procedures, the findings of this paper indicate that Italy displays levels of economic persistence that are most similar to the United States and Britain. Italy appears to be markedly less mobile than Sweden.
Additional international evidence is available if we consider also the studies that used different data and methodologies. A few recent studies have attempted to provide evidence on intergenerational mobility in rich countries with an explicit comparative perspective (Corak, 2006; Jantti et al., 2006; Blanden, 2005) . Although it is not possible to rank countries in a rigorous way according to their level of "overall" mobility, the evidence seems to suggest that among the wealthier countries, the Scandinavian countries and Canada are the most mobile societies. At the other extreme, the U.S. and the UK stand out as being the least mobile societies, with 40-50 percent of the fathers' income advantage being passed on to their sons.
Taking into account the possible biases arising from the data and the procedure adopted, the evidence provided in this paper shows Italy as being in the high-persistence group among advanced societies. In particular, I found especially high persistence at the top of the distribution, indicating that the economic position of wealthy families may well remain steady from generation to generation. Obviously, this evidence has to be considered suggestive, not conclusive, as better data and different estimation methods have been shown to significantly improve the reliability of the estimates in other countries. However, the present results are consistent with those from previous studies by both sociologists and economists that portrayed Italy as a "rigid" society.
Various tentative explanations of the low mobility in Italy can be suggested. I found that the inheritance process operating through superior educational attainments of those with rich parents, while important, accounted for a minor fraction of the intergenerational transmission coefficient. This result gives credibility to the hypothesis that in Italy children with the same level of formal education have unequal chances because of their family background.
This result may appear puzzling to the extent that a largely public educational system is expected to favor intergenerational mobility. The fact that the Italian labor market is characterized by the presence of extensive barriers to entry into a wide range of occupations might play an important role. 20 In fact, countries can differ significantly in the impact that educational spending may have on intergenerational mobility. It will depend on a larger set of "intangible" advantages that wealthy parents are able to pass on to their children, which includes not only family connections but also beliefs and motivations. 
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